After the rot: Improving the durability of building envelopes in domestic housing, New Zealand by Murphy, Chris
XXXVII IAHS  
World Congress on Housing 
October 26 – 29, 2010, Santander, Spain 
After the rot: Improving the Durability of Building Envelopes in 
Domestic Housing, New Zealand. 
Chris Murphy MArch ANZIA 
Department of Architecture 
Unitec Institute of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand 
e-mail: cmurphy@unitec.ac.nz 
Key words: Building technology, weathertightness, building controls. 
Abstract 
The issue of weathertightness of the external building envelope in domestic scaled timber 
frames continues to be an issue in New Zealand, some ten years after the results of a major 
cladding survey into the durability and weathertightness of the exterior cladding envelope 
carried out by the writer in the year 2000. The fallout from leaking buildings has estimated to 
have cost the country billions of dollars in lost production and expensive repair. The social 
impact on those caught up in the leaking home has been considerable, with often heart rending 
tales of stress and financial hardship the result.  
 
This paper will explore the initiatives taken by the building industry and the Government since 
the issue became a major public concern. It will examine the influences, both positive and 
negative, that resulting legislation and changed building practices brought in as a result of this 
crisis, have had on the sustainability and affordability of the domestic dwelling in New Zealand.  
1 Introduction 
In 1996, five years after the introduction of the first nationally binding performance based New 
Zealand Building Code, a change was made to the NZ Standard NZ3602 to allow the use of untreated 
kiln-dried pinus radiata in timber house framing. This change, which was subsequently retracted in 
2004,[1] has had significant and long term consequences for the NZ building industry. 
 
The rapid uptake of new cladding materials in the 1980s saw a decrease in the use of the traditional 
weatherboard and brick construction here in NZ and increased use of both face sealed proprietary rigid 
sheet cladding systems and the once commonly used, but largely forgotten, traditional stucco cladding 
system. The upsurge in the use of these “new” cladding materials coincided with other changes in the 
building industry. The running down of the apprenticeship programme, a rise in the number of 
apartment buildings under construction and a corresponding move away from traditional fixed price 
contracts to other forms of construction procurement to meet the rapid growth in this particular corner 
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of the housing sector, all combined to create a period of uncertainty that saw many operators handling 
new systems and materials in complex building forms without the necessary background and training.  
 
These societal factors had outcomes in terms of building performance. Deficiencies in the external 
building fabric continued to become apparent as inquiry and debate over the quality of construction 
intensified. In 2001 a report by the writer commissioned by the BIA [2] that surveyed some 287 pre-
purchase reports indicated some 60% of the dwellings inspected let in moisture through the cladding to 
an unacceptable degree. Whilst buildings in New Zealand had always leaded to some degree (NZ is a 
coastal climate and capable of extreme climate variation) what was different and new and picked up by 
the survey, was the significant percentage increase in cladding systems letting in moisture compared to 
the number of cladding cases constructed in the period following these societal changes and the 
introduction of the National Building Code in the 1990s. (Fig. 1) 
 
 
Figure 1: Defect v Cladding Cases 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Pre
20s
20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
No Defects
No Cladding Cases
1.1 Hunn Report. 
The Societal factors briefly outlined above were not the only reason for building deficiencies. Causes 
identified in the Hunn Report [3], a report commissioned by the Government in 2002 to investigate the 
causes of building failure due to moisture ingress, nominated a significant number of contributory 
causes including:  
• Inadequacy in the Building Code and Approved Documents 
• Inadequate documentation supplied for building consent. 
• Insufficient checking at building consent stage. 
• Inadequacy of building products, materials and components including evaluation of their 
suitability of fitness of purpose. 
• Inadequate contract documentation  
• Inadequate trade skills and supervision on site 
• Lack of co-operation and sharing of responsibility on site.  
1.2 Additional government initiatives. 
The public reaction to the Hunn Report was such that Government felt compelled to put into place 
additional procedures designed to restore public confidence in the building industry. One of these was 
the Weathertight Homes Resolution Service Act 2002, which set up a framework for mediation and 
adjudication between owner, contractor and other stakeholders. This act was later replaced by the 
WHRS Act 2006, which came into force on 1st April 2007, creating in turn the Weathertight Homes 
Tribunal, a judicially independent Tribunal providing adjudication on matters of weathertightness.  
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Additional initiatives included the movement of the Building Industry Authority (BIA), a crown entity, 
from the Internal Affairs ministry to the more proactive Ministry of Economic Development. Not 
content with these changes, and facing strong criticism from the public and media over inadequacies 
over the BIA’s role in the ongoing saga, the government in November 2004 established the 
Department of Building and Housing and transferred and absorbed the Building Industry Authority 
(BIA) functions to within that of the new Department. Government intentions to tighten up controls 
associated with Building and Construction were signaled in March 2003 through this ministry, 
culminating in the introduction of a major piece of new legislation, the Building Bill into Parliament 
on August 29th 2003. The Building Act 2004 came into effect in November 2004. [4] 
1.3 Building Act 2004. 
The Building Act 2004 repealed the Building Act 1991 and initiated the dissolution of the Building 
Industry Authority, by then a largely discredited governing body that had overseen and regulated the 
building industry under the initial 1991 Building Act. It remains, to this day, albeit in amended form, 
the legislation that governs the building industry in New Zealand, a long overdue attempt to tighten up 
many aspects of the regulatory framework and introduce heightened levels of scrutiny into the building 
consent and inspection process. 
2 Changes to building practices and procedures post 2004  
Analysis within this section is by necessity an overview based on a combination of anecdotal evidence 
including interview with key personnel within the building industry, analysis of Government statistical 
data and Government reports In summarizing the writer’s opinions within this section it has been 
found useful to discuss within the Hunn Report’s 2002 summary of contributory deficiencies 
mentioned above: 
2.1 “Inadequacy in the Building Code and Approved Documents”.  
The Hunn Report instigated two significant changes to the Building Code and the Approved 
Documents. The first was a change to the Acceptable Solution B2/AS1 affecting durability, the second 
a detailed expansion of the Acceptable Solution E2/AS1, covering external moisture.  
 
2.1.1  Changes to Acceptable Solution B2/AS1  
 
Many in the building industry would argue that more damage was done to building sustainability in 
NZ through liberalizing the timber durability requirements of the Code than by any other cause. The 
tightening of the regulations as a result of the submission process that commenced in June 2003 was a 
significant retreat for the BIA, which in 1996 permitted the use of untreated pinus radiata within all 
parts of the timber framed building.  
 
The proposed changes ironically met strong resistance from some quarters, particularly from timber 
industry suppliers and millers who saw severe restrictions in the traditional use of the Douglas Fir 
species as a result of increased treatment requirements. There were other concerns, including 
environmental concerns, particularly amongst the users who were to handle the new levels of treated 
timber and others including Architects, who saw the move to more environmental friendly products as 
a step in the right direction.  
 
 
 
 Chris Murphy  
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with using untreated timber, including untreated radiata pine, in any 
building or housing construction. …[the only proviso would be that] if green or wet on installation, or if 
occasionally wetted after that, they should be allowed to dry out. [5] 
 
On the other hand respectable research institutions like the Forest Research strongly supported a return 
to a comprehensive treatment regime for pinus radiata: 
 
Forest Research believes that the risk of decay or insect attack during the 50 years of required durability is 
too high to support the use of untreated radiate pine in structural applications [6] 
 
2.1.2 Changes to Acceptable Solution E2/AS1 External Moisture.  
 
Revision of this Acceptable Solution within the Building Code was extensive and marked the first 
serious attempt to document in a prescriptive way standard domestic building practice since the 
Building Code was first introduced in 1991. Of particular note was the reintroduction to the building 
fraternity of the window flashing system, devices and systems largely lost to the industry since the 
introduction of the aluminum window in the 1970s and 1980s replaced the more traditional timber 
window profiles.  
 
Also significant was an attempt for the first time to access the degree of exposure of a particular 
building on a site based on the complexity of the elevation profile and its exposure to the elements, 
and to prescribe levels of compliance for the cladding system based on the results, a procedure that has 
seen the introduction of the drained cavity as an almost permanent feature of the domestic building 
envelope 
 
2.2 “Inadequate documentation supplied for Building Consent; 
  Insufficient checking at building consent stage.” 
 
Most architectural practitioners would firmly agree the building consent authorities have strengthened 
their procedures (some would argue excessively so) to the granting of a building consent in the years 
following the 2004 Act than would have been the case in the years preceding it, for the following 
reasons.  
 
The pre building act environment traditionally saw inspectorate attention devoted to structural aspects 
of the building framework, typically the structural integrity of the flooring, walls (including bracing) 
and roof. Cladding integrity and the inspection thereof were not considered as important elements in 
the checking process. Cladding design and installation often followed well formulated design and 
build procedures using well known materials. By and large, for the more traditional brick and timber 
weatherboard structures, particularly where free of insulation, this approach was satisfactory.  
 
The advent of more complex cladding systems, elevation profiles and larger, more complex  structures 
within the domestic market in the 1980s and 1990s, along with the introduction of monolithic type 
face fixed cladding systems, cavity insulation and kiln dried chemical free timber studs meant this 
approach was no longer sufficient. Yet both designer and the local authority consent processor were 
slow to adapt and are now, along with the public owners of the leaking dwellings, suffering financially 
with the consequences of court action and damages for poor quality documentation and incorrectly 
signed off compliance certificates.  
 
If the building consent authorities were slow off the mark, then recent processing systems generated by 
the Territorial Authority have more than compensated. A rigorous and comprehensive approval system 
has replaced the laissez faire attitude of yesterday. Encouraging this new approach is the accreditation 
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scheme regime for TAs instigated by the 2004 Act that rewards competent Authorities and potentially 
removes the right to process building consents from the less able. An increasing litigious environment 
that has exposed slack practices has also been a spur. 
 
2.3  “Inadequate trade skills and supervision on site;  
  Inadequate contract documentation.  
  Lack of co-operation and sharing of responsibility on site.” 
 
2.3.1 Building Surveyor.  
 
The deficiencies noted in the Hunn Report above were certainly prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s and 
coincided with a shortage of apprentices and a shortage of competently trained trade persons able to 
deal with new and complex cladding systems. The growth of continuing professional training schemes 
for trades and the impending licensing system are signs of a response to this need to raise standards.  
 
Equally interesting and in line with the growth in specialist recladding companies and systems has 
been the recent growth of the super inspector or professional building surveyor, a career professional  
probably known in more benign times as a “clerk of works” but now the product of specialist private 
training courses, usually at post graduate level, designed to meet the investigative and supervisory 
skills required for the expensive and complex re-cladding process. This specialist activity has been the 
cause of criticism, particularly in the extent to which their services are required by Territorial 
Authorities, and the resultant extent to which using their services adds to the substantive cost of the 
renovation process. Nonetheless, the use of the specialist has found favor with the risk averse 
Territorial Authorities and is becoming established as a part of any re cladding inspection process, an 
example being the Auckland City Council, where re-cladding consents must now have:  
 
….Three additional inspections at key stages of the works. These inspections will be undertaken by 
specialist building officers and are known as “category one” inspections. The inspections are additional to 
the existing and final inspections that will be completed by other inspection staff...[7] 
 
There is a touch of irony in the rigorous attitude of the TA “poacher now turned gamekeeper”, 
particularly as it is be the long suffering owner paying the additional fees for these additional 
recladding inspection, brought about in many cases by the same TA not taking dutiful care in the first 
instance! 
 
2.3.2 Licensed Building Practitioner Scheme. 
 
The introduction of the Licensed Building Practitioners scheme was introduced to redress the 
respective deficiency identified in the Hunn Report causes outlined above. It has signified a further 
turning away from the traditional egalitarian DIY culture that permeated NZ life up to the 1900s, 
where the amateur home grown renovator and builder have always been able to construct their dream 
alongside the qualified tradesman. Unfortunately in the post weatherboard and bungalow era, 
enthusiasm was not enough. Deficiencies in construction as a result of inadequate training and on site 
supervision were a listed as a notable contribution to the leaky building crisis.  
 
The LBP scheme, introduced in 2004 with the new Act and modified in 2010 year is, for the moment, 
a competency based, and until March 2012,  voluntary scheme that enables builders and trades people 
with a genuine track record “…to have their skills and knowledge formally recognized, whether they 
are trade-qualified or not. “ [8] 
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Come March 2010 the consequences surrounding licensing tighten, with persons not licensed 
restricted from undertaking and signing off responsibility for certain types of building work, including, 
as can be expected, work associated with the construction of the weathertight cladding system, the 
primary structure including foundations and framing, and the design of certain types of fire systems in 
small to medium sized residential apartments.  
 
In 2015 this competency based system moves to a qualification based one, with applicants after this 
date required to have the appropriate trade qualification. 
 
Given the number of home grown builders operating in the industry the government probably had little 
choice but to allow the competent unqualified person to continue to practice whilst this interim system 
is in place. Not to do so would have resulted in considerable dislocation to the building industry and 
caused a severe and abrupt shortage of qualified personnel to meet the needs of the industry.  
 
2.3.3. Emergence of the Re-cladding Contractor as a specialist sub-trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             
Figure 2: Reliant Group. Before and After Re-cladding Examples [9] 
 
The flow of contractors seeking work into what has become a lucrative source of income is inevitable, 
and to some extent desirable, if it means the fractured and ill-supervised nature of site supervision 
identified in the Hunn Report is to be reversed. Building firms suitably qualified, conversant with 
Territorial Authority requirements, the critical nature of the work and with a clear understanding of 
weathertightness principles are a desirable commodity for any building project, but particularly for the 
time consuming and expensive task of re-making a moisture prone building envelope waterproof in the 
semi tropical climate that is Auckland’s.   
 
How specialist is the “specialist.” Most rely on web promotion and advertizing with client references, 
membership of building organizations, testimonials and completed projects (Fig 2) to back up their 
claim as competent. The formation of a self monitoring collective or association of approved  
operators within which critical reflectance and a forum for continuing professional development can 
occur would be the logical next step in ensuring the body of knowledge gained in this specialist work 
continues to grow and be disseminated to as wide an audience as possible.  
3 Conclusion 
The liberalization of timber treatment was, in part, an attempt to introduce a more environmentally 
friendly regime of timber use and treatment to a world much more conscious of the harmful use of 
chemicals. It is a tragedy that the wholesale removal of building controls limiting untreated timber was 
poorly thought through and instigated without due regard to other influences impacting on the 
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effectiveness of this significant change. Poorly quality cladding products inadequately installed that 
allow water to penetrate a in a multitude of ways is no environment for a untreated pinus radiata 
framing system. 
 
The extensive upgrade of E2/AS1 and the punitive environment surrounding an alternative solution, 
has unfortunately put standardized solutions to the fore at the expense of innovation and creativity in 
the detailed design field, aspects the original 1991 Building Code set out to encourage.  
 
Building consent procedures and documentation requirements have been considerably tightened since 
1990 levels, when most domestic consent applications were granted based on location drawings, 
bracing requirements and evidence of structural integrity alone. The Building Act 2004 has put in 
place for all stakeholders in the building industry levels of compliance unprecedented in the history of 
building in New Zealand. The current building consent application process has been criticized as being 
too heavy handed, risk averse and rigid, leading to standardized solutions in the treatment of the 
external fabric devoid of creativity. Yet, litigation outcomes have targeted Territorial Authorities 
severely, often as the “last person standing” in a situation where developer and contractor and long 
since vanished, and it is understandable these Authorities are taking all action necessary to discharge 
their duties in such a way as to minimize loss.  
 
The licensing scheme, the rise of the building surveyor and the growth of the recladding “specialist” 
are all pointers to changes in the building environment brought about by poorly performing buildings, 
and are indicative of procedures that will hopefully result in better outcomes for the future home 
owners here in New Zealand.  
 
Figure 3: Covec Ltd. Cost Comparisons [10] 
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How successful this amended Act has been in terms of stopping the chronic decline in building 
standards is as yet hard to gauge. If it were to be judged based on estimates of the ever increasing cost 
to the economy of the ongoing social and physical costs of refurbishment, then it would be judged a 
distinct failure.  
 
Table 1: Cost Estimate Comparison 
 
Analysis Source  Year  Estimate no. homes with 
weather tightness issues 
Estimated cost 
assessed in  
2008 $ 
PwC Report[12] 2009 42,000 $11.3 Billion  
PwC Report[12]  2005 12,000 $1.1 Billion  
CINZ [11] 2000 11,270 $890Million.  
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To this end, the recently completed government initiated Price Waterhouse Cooper’s report [12] on 
estimating the cost of the weathertightness problem paints a depressing picture of escalating numbers 
of effected buildings that dwarfs the estimates of earlier years. The recently completed Covec report 
has even compared the problem to a scale of disaster in 2008 terms on a par with the Napier 
earthquake. [10] (Fig 3, Table 1).  
 
An assessment of the Amended Act’s effectiveness based on money terms is of course unfair. The 
consensus indicates most of the damage has been done to buildings between the years 1992 leading up 
to the change in legislation in 2004. The PwC research report indicates some grounds for optimism in 
that rates on unsatisfactory and leaking building envelopes are on the decline.  
 
Failure rates since 2006 appear to be much lower than in previous years, suggesting changes in the 
regulatory requirements and building practices have addressed the major problems identified in the past 
and reduced the incidence of weathertightness issues. [12] 
 
If this is so, it marks further evidence that the many changes brought to the Building Act 2004 
discussed in this paper have begun to bear results, and that is surely well overdue good news for the 
NZ building industry.  
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